Landing with engines turned off. The pilots told what happens to the plane if one engine fails. Should I tell passengers?

26.07.2023

Landing with the engines inoperative is in itself more than a difficult flight situation. For example, pilots on twin-engine aircraft in military aviation practice a flight only with an imitation of one engine failure (IOD), this is when one engine is set to MG mode and a flight is carried out to pilot the aircraft, then an approach and landing itself with an IOD. As it later turned out in practice, flying with an IOD and flying with the engine turned off are TWO VERY BIG DIFFERENCES. Despite the fact that the engines are installed almost close to the aircraft axis, the resulting turning moments are quite large and unexpected.

But landing without an engine (more precisely, its imitation) was practiced only if it was provided for in the Pilot’s Instructions, and the exercise was performed on a pre-selected site with the required dimensions or when landing at one’s own airfield, when each bush is its own, so to speak. As a rule, on training aircraft and with an instructor.
Therefore, cases of landing without engines on civil aircraft are a rather unique phenomenon:
1. It’s easier to land in the fog.
2. No skills.
3. Responsibility - the lives of passengers
4. Your life after the third point
etc.

The number of such landings depends on the chosen time of aviation, on piston aircraft - this was a very common phenomenon, there were such engines and there were such aircraft - some provided assistance, others allowed you to land wherever possible.
In jet aviation, forced landings began to end in disaster more often; this became a phenomenon when, when testing the first supersonic jet aircraft, test pilots tried to save the aircraft and preserve the cause of the failure by performing an emergency landing.
Although as they say, to whom is heaven, to whom is hell. The cadets managed to regularly land without an engine - apparently the saying that fools are lucky was fully manifested here.
So, let's begin.
Much-hyped, it’s already familiar to us. If so, read it.
From the Soviet well-known cases -

A lesser known, but more modern story about the Tu-204.
On January 14, 2002, the Tu-204 landed in Omsk with its engines not working. When landing, the plane rolled out of the runway by more than 400 meters. None of the passengers were injured. It seems so banal...
On January 14, 2002, a serious aviation incident occurred with the Siberia Airlines Tu-204 RA-64011 aircraft.
The crew was operating flight 852 on the route Frankfurt am Main - Tolmachevo. There were 117 passengers and 22 crew members on board. According to the MSRP, the aircraft had 28,197 kg of fuel before takeoff. Barnaul was chosen as an alternate airfield. The flight along the route was carried out at an altitude of 10,100 meters. Before descending for landing at Tolmachevo airport, according to MSRP data, there were 5443 kg of fuel on board the aircraft. At the alternate airfield of Barnaul, the weather conditions did not correspond to the minimum weather conditions, and therefore the crew chose the alternate airfield of Omsk (the amount of fuel for departure to it, according to the crew’s calculations, should be 4800 kg).
Due to the expectation of improved weather conditions at the Tolmachevo airfield, the crew performed a flight pattern at an altitude of 1,500 meters for about 10 minutes, after which they began their approach. While performing the landing approach, the crew received information that the crosswind component exceeded the limits established by the flight manual of the Tu-204 aircraft and, with the flight guide, decided to proceed to the alternate airfield Omsk if, according to the crew, there were 4800 kg of fuel on board the aircraft (according to MSRP- 4064 kg). The weather forecast for the Novosibirsk-Omsk route included a headwind of 120-140 km/h. While climbing, the alarm about the reserve fuel balance of 2600 kg went off; according to the crew’s explanations, the balance was 3600 kg (according to MSRP - 3157 kg). The investigation commission found that the crew allowed the possibility of landing with the engines inoperative, and therefore the descent from the flight level of 9600 meters began at a distance of 150 km (direct approach). At an altitude of about 1600 m and a distance of 17-14 km from the airfield, a sequential shutdown of the engines occurred. After the emergency release of the mechanization and landing gear, the crew landed on the runway with a flight distance of 1,480 meters. During the run, emergency braking was applied. The plane rolled off the runway at a speed of about 150 km/h, destroying 14 lights while moving along the checkpoint and stopping at a distance of 452 meters from the end of the runway. Passengers and crew were not injured; the tire tires had minor damage. The investigation into this event continues. It should be noted that weather forecasts for the airfields of Novosibirsk (in terms of visibility) and Omsk (in terms of wind and visibility) did not come true.

Even less well known is the accident of the Yak-40 of the Ukrainian CAA near Armavir on December 7, 1976.
At 18:14 Moscow time, when approaching the Mineralnye Vody airport, the crew received instructions from the dispatcher to leave for an alternate airfield due to difficult weather conditions in the area of the Mineralnye Vody airport (fog, visibility less than 300 m). The crew requested landing at Stavropol airport. The dispatcher did not give permission for it, saying that there was fog in Stavropol with visibility of 300 m. The plane was sent to Krasnodar airport with little fuel remaining. Since, according to the crew’s calculations, there was not enough fuel to reach Krasnodar, it was decided to make an emergency landing at a military airfield in Armavir. On the pre-landing straight, the engines stopped due to fuel exhaustion. The crew managed to make an emergency landing in a field 2 km from the runway. The plane stopped among small trees. None of the passengers or crew members on board were injured. The plane was damaged and was written off.
During the investigation, it was established that at the time when the crew was denied landing in Stavropol, visibility in the area of its airport was not below the minimum and amounted to 700 m, which made it possible to land.

Well, military aviation happens in different ways - for example, the landing of a twin Su-7u after the engine stops after passing the DPRM, that is, at an altitude of about 200 m due to the failure of the fuel pumps. A Su-7u without an engine is aerodynamically equal to a brick. But here the instructor’s experience worked - they sat right in front of them, they didn’t choose the field - here they were 1001% lucky /
1981 Millerovo airfield.

And then the good old An-12 showed its advantage, and even in an open field, it can do anything if the commander shows how.

Although it happens...
An-8 crash ICHP Avia (Novosibirsk) near Chita airport October 30, 1992 RA-69346
The plane belonged to NAPO im. Chkalov, was leased to IChP Avia (Novosibirsk) and operated a commercial flight on the route Elizovo - Okha - Mogocha - Chita - Novosibirsk. There were 9 passengers on board, including two service passengers, all Russian citizens. The cargo consisted of 3 Toyota cars and fish products in cardboard boxes. The declared cargo weight is 4,260 kg. When landing at night in normal weather conditions, on the pre-landing straight, at a distance of 6 km from the runway threshold, the aircraft mark disappeared on the control radar screen and radio communication with the crew stopped. The aircraft was found at a distance of 1,600 meters from the threshold of the Chita airfield runway. The crew and 8 passengers were killed, one passenger was seriously injured and subsequently died. The aircraft was completely destroyed from the flight deck to the cargo compartment. The commission found that the landing approach was carried out with a low fuel balance and a landing weight exceeding the permissible weight by approximately 5 tons. Due to fuel exhaustion, the right engine stopped before the fourth turn, and the left engine stopped on the landing straight. The plane began to descend and, at a distance of 1,657 m from the runway, collided with the ground, and then, after running 15 m, with sand dumps. The disaster occurred at 04:47 local time (22:47 Moscow time on October 29).

Gimli Glider is the unofficial name of one of Air Canada's Boeing 767 aircraft, received after an unusual accident that occurred on July 23, 1983. This aircraft was operating flight AC143 from Montreal to Edmonton (with an intermediate stop in Ottawa). During the flight, he unexpectedly ran out of fuel and the engines stopped. After much planning, the plane successfully landed at the closed military base of Gimli. All 69 people on board - 61 passengers and 8 crew members - survived.

AIRPLANE
Boeing 767-233 (registration number C-GAUN, factory 22520, serial 047) was released in 1983 (first flight made on March 10). On March 30 of the same year it was transferred to Air Canada. Equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4D engines.

CREW
The aircraft's commander is Robert "Bob" Pearson. Flighted over 15,000 hours.
Co-pilot - Maurice Quintal. Flighted over 7000 hours.
Six flight attendants worked in the aircraft cabin.

ENGINE FAILURE

At an altitude of 12,000 meters, a signal suddenly sounded warning of low pressure in the fuel system of the left engine. The on-board computer showed that there was more than enough fuel, but its readings, as it later turned out, were based on erroneous information entered into it. Both pilots decided that the fuel pump was faulty and turned it off. Since the tanks are located above the engines, under the influence of gravity, the fuel had to flow into the engines without pumps, by gravity. But a few minutes later, a similar signal from the right engine sounded, and the pilots decided to change course to Winnipeg (the nearest suitable airport). A few seconds later, the left engine cut out and they began preparing for a single engine landing.

While the pilots were trying to start the left engine and negotiating with Winnipeg, the acoustic engine failure signal sounded again, accompanied by another additional sound signal - a long, percussive "boom-m-m-m" sound. Both pilots heard this sound for the first time, since it had not sounded before during their work on simulators. This was a signal “failure of all engines” (this type of aircraft has two). The plane was left without power, and most of the instrument panels on the panel went out. By this time, the plane had already dropped to 8500 meters, heading towards Winnipeg.

Like most aircraft, the Boeing 767 gets its electricity from generators powered by the engines. The shutdown of both engines led to a complete blackout of the aircraft's electrical system; The pilots had only backup instruments at their disposal, autonomously powered from the on-board battery, including the radio station. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the pilots found themselves without a very important device - a variometer that measures vertical speed. In addition, the pressure in the hydraulic system dropped, since the hydraulic pumps were also driven by the engines.

However, the aircraft was designed to withstand failure of both engines. The emergency turbine, driven by the oncoming air flow, automatically started. Theoretically, the electricity it generates should be enough to keep the plane under control when landing.

The PIC was getting used to controlling the glider, and the co-pilot immediately began looking in the emergency instructions for a section on piloting an aircraft without engines, but there was no such section. Fortunately, the PIC had flown gliders, so he was proficient in some flying techniques that commercial airline pilots usually do not use. He knew that to reduce the rate of descent he had to maintain an optimal glide speed. He maintained a speed of 220 knots (407 km/h), suggesting that the optimal glide speed should be approximately this. The co-pilot began to calculate whether they would make it to Winnipeg. He used a backup mechanical altimeter to determine the altitude, and the distance traveled was reported to him by a controller in Winnipeg, determining it by the movement of the plane's mark on the radar. The airliner lost 5,000 feet (1.5 km) of altitude after flying 10 nautical miles (18.5 km), giving the airframe a lift-to-drag ratio of approximately 12. The controller and co-pilot concluded that flight AC143 would not make it to Winnipeg.

Then the co-pilot chose Gimli Air Base, where he had previously served, as the landing site. He didn't know that the base had been closed by that time, and that Runway 32L, where they decided to land, had been converted into a car racing track, with a powerful separation barrier placed in the middle of it. On this day there was a “family holiday” for the local car club, there were races on the former runway and there were a lot of people there. In the beginning twilight, the runway was illuminated with lights.

The air turbine did not provide sufficient pressure in the hydraulic system to properly extend the landing gear, so the pilots attempted to lower the landing gear in an emergency. The main landing gear came out fine, but the nose gear came out but did not lock.

Shortly before landing, the commander realized that the plane was flying too high and too fast. He reduced the plane's speed to 180 knots, and to lose altitude, he performed a maneuver atypical for commercial airliners - sliding onto the wing (the pilot presses the left pedal and turns the steering wheel to the right or vice versa, while the aircraft quickly loses speed and altitude). However, this maneuver reduced the rotation speed of the emergency turbine, and the pressure in the hydraulic control system dropped even more. Pearson was able to pull the plane out of the maneuver almost at the last moment.

The plane was descending onto the runway, and the racers and spectators began to scatter from it. When the landing gear wheels touched the runway, the commander pressed the brakes. The tires instantly overheated, the emergency valves released air from them, the unfixed nose landing gear collapsed, the nose touched the concrete, creating a plume of sparks, and the right engine nacelle hit the ground. People managed to leave the runway, and the commander did not have to roll the plane out of it, saving people on the ground. The plane stopped less than 30 meters from the spectators.

A small fire started in the nose of the plane, and the command was given to begin evacuating passengers. Because the tail was up, the slope of the inflatable slide in the rear emergency exit was too great, and several people were slightly injured, but no one was seriously injured. The fire was soon put out by motorists with dozens of hand-held fire extinguishers.

Two days later the plane was repaired on site and was able to fly from Gimli. After additional repairs costing about $1 million, the aircraft was returned to service. On January 24, 2008, the aircraft was sent to a storage base in the Mojave Desert.

CIRCUMSTANCES

Information about the amount of fuel in the Boeing 767 tanks is calculated by the Fuel Quantity Indicator System (FQIS) and displayed on indicators in the cockpit. The FQIS on this aircraft consisted of two channels that independently calculated the amount of fuel and verified the results. It was possible to operate the aircraft with only one serviceable channel in case one of them failed, but in this case the displayed number had to be checked by a float indicator before departure. If both channels failed, the amount of fuel in the cabin would not be displayed; the plane should have been declared faulty and not allowed to fly.

Following the discovery of FQIS malfunctions on other 767 series aircraft, Boeing issued an advisory regarding the routine FQIS inspection procedure. An engineer in Edmonton carried out this procedure following the arrival of C-GAUN from Toronto the day before the incident. During this inspection, the FQIS completely failed and the fuel quantity indicators in the cockpit stopped working. Earlier that month, the engineer encountered the same problem on the same aircraft. Then he discovered that turning off the second channel by the circuit breaker restored the functionality of the fuel quantity indicators, although now their readings were based on data from only one channel. Due to the lack of spare parts, the engineer simply reproduced the temporary solution he had found earlier: he pressed and marked the circuit breaker switch with a special label, turning off the second channel.

On the day of the incident, the plane was flying from Edmonton to Montreal with an intermediate stop in Ottawa. Before takeoff, the engineer informed the crew commander about the problem and indicated that the amount of fuel as indicated by the FQIS system should be checked by a float indicator. The pilot misunderstood the engineer and believed that the plane with this defect had already flown yesterday from Toronto. The flight went well, the fuel quantity indicators worked on data from one channel.

In Montreal, the crews were changed; Pearson and Quintal were supposed to fly back to Edmonton via Ottawa. The replacement pilot informed them of the problem with the FQIS, conveying to them his misconception that the plane had flown with this problem yesterday. In addition, PIC Pearson also misunderstood his predecessor: he believed that he was told that FQIS had not worked at all since that time.

In preparation for the flight to Edmonton, the technician decided to investigate a problem with the FQIS. To test the system, he turned on the second FQIS channel - the indicators in the cockpit stopped working. At this moment he was called to measure the amount of fuel in the tanks with a float indicator. Distracted, he forgot to turn off the second channel, but did not remove the label from the switch. The switch remained marked, and now it was not obvious that the circuit was closed. From that point on, the FQIS did not work at all, and the indicators in the cockpit showed nothing.

The aircraft's maintenance log kept a record of all actions. There was also an entry “SERVICE CHK - FOUND FUEL QTY IND BLANK - FUEL QTY #2 C/B PULLED & TAGGED...” Of course, this reflected a malfunction (the indicators stopped showing the amount of fuel) and the action taken (disabling the second FQIS channel), but it was not clearly indicated that the action corrected the malfunction.

Entering the cockpit, PIC Pearson saw exactly what he expected: non-functioning fuel quantity indicators and a marked switch. He checked the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and found out that in this condition the plane was not suitable for departure. However, at that time the Boeing 767, which made its first flight only in September 1981, was a very new aircraft. C-GAUN was the 47th Boeing 767 produced; Air Canada received it less than 4 months ago. During this time, 55 amendments had already been made to the list of minimum required equipment, and some pages were still blank because the corresponding procedures had not yet been developed. Due to the unreliability of the list information, a procedure was introduced into practice for the approval of each Boeing 767 flight by technical personnel. In addition to misconceptions about the condition of the aircraft on previous flights, reinforced by what Pearson saw in the cockpit with his own eyes, he had a signed maintenance log that cleared the departure - and in practice, the technicians' clearance took precedence over the requirements of the list.

The incident happened at a time when Canada was switching to the metric system. As part of this transition, all Boeing 767s received by Air Canada were the first aircraft to use the metric system and operate in liters and kilograms rather than gallons and pounds. All other aircraft used the same system of weights and measures. According to the pilot's calculations, the flight to Edmonton required 22,300 kg of fuel. Measurement with a float indicator showed that there were 7682 liters of fuel in the aircraft tanks. To determine the volume of fuel for refueling, it was necessary to convert the volume of fuel into mass, subtract the result from 22,300 and convert the answer back to liters. According to Air Canada's instructions for other types of aircraft, this action should have been performed by a flight engineer, but the Boeing 767 crew did not have one: the new generation aircraft was controlled by only two pilots. Air Canada's job descriptions did not delegate responsibility for this task to anyone.

A liter of aviation kerosene weighs 0.803 kilograms, that is, the correct calculation looks like this:

7682 l × 0.803 kg/l = 6169 kg
22,300 kg - 6,169 kg = 16,131 kg
16,131 kg ÷ 0.803 kg/l = 20,089 l
However, neither the Flight 143 crew nor the ground crew knew this. As a result of discussion, it was decided to use a coefficient of 1.77 - the mass of a liter of fuel in pounds. It was this coefficient that was recorded in the tanker’s handbook and was always used on all other aircraft. Therefore the calculations were as follows:

7682 l × 1.77 “kg”/l = 13,597 “kg”
22,300 kg - 13,597 "kg" = 8703 kg
8703 kg ÷ 1.77 “kg”/l = 4916 l
Instead of the required 20,089 liters (which would correspond to 16,131 kilograms) of fuel, 4916 liters (3948 kg) entered the tanks, that is, more than four times less than required. Taking into account the fuel available on board, its quantity was enough for 40-45% of the journey. Since the FQIS was not working, the commander checked the calculation, but used the same factor and, of course, got the same result.

The flight control computer (FCC) measures fuel consumption, allowing the crew to monitor the amount of fuel burned during flight. Under normal conditions, the PMC receives data from the FQIS, but if the FQIS fails, the initial value can be entered manually. The PIC was sure that there were 22,300 kg of fuel on board, and entered exactly this number.

Since the PSC was reset during a stop in Ottawa, the PIC again measured the amount of fuel in the tanks with a float indicator. When converting liters to kilograms, the wrong coefficient was again used. The crew believed that the tanks contained 20,400 kg of fuel, when in fact there was still less than half the required amount of fuel.
wikipedia

Flying is a challenging experience for many people, and passengers are always worried that something might go wrong several thousand meters above the ground. So what actually happens when an engine fails mid-flight? Is this really the time to panic?

The reasons for engine failure in flight can be a lack of fuel, as well as the ingestion of birds and volcanic ash.

Are we really going to fall?!

Although it may seem like the plane will crash if the engine stops working, fortunately, this is not the case at all.

For pilots, flying a plane at idle is not unusual. Two pilots, who wished to remain anonymous, told the truth to Express.co.uk. “If one engine fails mid-flight, it does not pose too much of a problem, since modern aircraft can fly on one engine,” one pilot told the publication.

Modern aircraft are designed to glide over fairly long distances without the use of engines. Considering the large number of airports in the world, most likely the ship will fly to the landing site and be able to land.

If a plane flies with one engine, there is no reason to panic.

What to do if one engine fails - step-by-step instructions

A pilot from another airline explained step by step what steps they take when an engine fails. It is necessary to set a certain speed and get maximum performance from the second running engine.

Should I tell passengers?

Sitting in the cabin, you may not realize that the engine has failed. Whether the captain tells passengers what happened "depends very much on the specific situation as well as airline policy." This is the captain's decision.

If engine failure is obvious to passengers, then the captain must explain the situation to them truthfully. But to avoid panic if no one notices anything, you can remain silent.

Successful landings

In 1982, a British Airways flight to Jakarta, Indonesia was struck by volcanic ash at 11,000 meters and caused all four engines to fail. The pilot managed to hold the plane for 23 minutes, he flew 91 miles in this way and slowly descended from an altitude of 11 km to 3600 m. During this time, the team managed to restart all engines and land safely. And this is not the only happy occasion.